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Gender quotas have shown themselves to be an effective means of getting more women 
into political office – when they are adopted the descriptive representation of women is 
likely to increase (De Paola et al, 2010; Franceschet et al, 2012; Krook 2010; Tripp and 
Kang, 2008).1 The downstream effects of these increases are widespread, with existing 
research showing that women in the electorate are more likely to participate in politics 
when women candidates stand for election, that political party elites are less biased 
against women, that political cultures become less sexist, and that negative stereotypes 
surrounding women in politics dissipate (Beaman et al 2009; Wolbrecht and Campbell 
2007; Lawless and Fox 2010; Gilardi 2014; O'Brien and Rickne 2015).2 
Although this expanding body of research has turned attention towards the impact of 
quotas in terms of political behaviour and descriptive representation, broader effects on 
attitudes towards women as political actors remain under-researched. Existing research is 
drawn predominantly from single-country case studies of India and Lesotho, a small 
nation in southern Africa. Outside of these mixed country-specific findings, 
understanding of how gender quotas impact broader attitudes to women as political 
leaders is limited. It is this gap in scholarly understanding of gender quotas that we 
address for the first time in this paper. 
Using a cross-national dataset of forty-eight countries worldwide we examine the role of 
gender quotas in the generation of individual-level attitudes to women as political 
leaders. We make three tentative but distinct contributions to the literature. Firstly, 
having accounted for a range of individual and contextual influences, we find that gender 
quotas appear to increase overall levels of support for women’s ability as political leaders 
in a country where they are present. Second, we demonstrate that this effect differs by 
sex. For women, the presence of gender quotas alone increases their support for women’s 
political leadership, something we theorise as a ‘vote of confidence’ effect, whereby 
belief in the ability of women as a whole to perform well as political leaders is bolstered 
by elite implementation of quotas. Thirdly, we demonstrate that this quota effect is not 
dependent on the type of quota implemented and applies for quotas voluntarily adopted 
by individual political parties and those quotas that are implemented with legal force and 
apply to all parties within a country. Overall, we claim that the presence of quotas alone 
itself appears to help normalise the presence and association of women and politics, 
regardless of any policy-focused or compositional impacts they may have on political 
life. 
 
Attitudes to Women in Politics 
There is a large body of existing research that examines individual-level attitudes 
regarding societal gender roles and propensity to support feminist ideals.3 Being a 
woman, higher levels of education, employment, higher occupational status, higher 
income, and being part of an ethnic minority have all been associated with enhancing 
gender egalitarian attitudes, whereas those who are married (especially with children), 
older in age and/or religious are significantly less likely to express support for feminist 
ideas and women in politics (Banaszak and Plutzer, 1993a; Morgan and Buice, 2013). 
Other explanations stress the impact of left-leaning ideological tendencies, with some 
evidence that those who share general democratic values such as tolerance for minorities 
and outsiders are also more likely to advocate equality and rights for women (Inglehart 
and Norris, 2003). Dissatisfaction with traditional male dominated elites may also result 
in increased support for women in politics (Morgan and Buice, 2013).4 
It has become increasingly apparent that individual attitudes to women are additionally 
influenced by the social and political context. Scholars have offered competing 
explanations of the influence of contextual effects on attitudes towards women in politics 
and broader support for feminism (Morgan and Buice, 2013). Status discontent theory 
suggests that female empowerment is perceived as a threat by men in social, economic, 
and political terms (Franceschet et al, 2012). In the face of female advancement, it is 
argued that men will seek to reinforce traditional gender norms and as a consequence are 
more likely to be reactionary in their attitudes to women in politics. Alternatively, 
socialization theory contends that female empowerment is not perceived as a threat by 
men but instead reflects the broader replacement of conservative traditional values with 
new social structures that promote egalitarianism (Morgan and Buice 2013). Increasing 
female power and status in all areas of society is seen to nurture greater approval of 
gender equality overall (Alexander 2012; Banaszak and Plutzer 1993b; Phillips 1995).  
Finally, scholarship suggests that elite cues can shape mass attitudes on issues relating to 
gender equality through their conduct (Zaller 1992; Kittilson 2010). This includes, for 
example, proposing and implementing certain policies, communicating to the public on 
issues of equality, or filling key political positions with individuals from traditionally 
underrepresented groups. Scholars have suggested that women and men may respond in 
different ways to such elite behaviour (Morgan and Buice, 2013). It is hypothesized that 
women are more likely to hold firm opinions on issues of gender equality based on their 
own life experiences and are thus less likely to fluctuate. Conversely, men’s attitudes are 
thought to be weaker and more prone to influence from elite cues (Beaman et al, 2009). 
As a consequence, the adoption of quotas, or their subsequent impact on legislative or 
executive composition, could be expected to have an impact on public attitudes towards 
women in politics that differs by sex.  
 
Do gender quotas change attitudes to women in politics? 
Existing comparative research on the spread of gender quotas has described how 
countries, states, or regions have come to adopt the policy (Dahlerup and Friedenvall 
2010; Krook 2013; O’Brien 2012; Sater, 2012). Beyond this, scholars have explored the 
effect of gender quotas on candidate selection, electoral performance, political 
engagement and the dynamics of internal party democracy.5 Generally, however, studies 
addressing any possible link between the presence of gender quotas and attitudes to 
women in politics are limited, with existing evidence originating solely from single-
country experimental case studies carried out in India and Lesotho (Beaman et al 2009; 
Clayton 2014a; 2014b).6 
In India, following a 1993 constitutional amendment, gender quotas in the form of 
reserved seats for women (along with two other traditionally-marginalized groups) were 
randomly assigned to village councils across a series of elections. In addition to reserving 
a third of ‘village council’ (gram panchayat) seats for women, a third of all ‘chief village 
councillor’ seats in each district, the position of pradhan, were also reserved (Beaman et 
al, 2009). Academic studies have taken advantage of this natural experiment to assess 
quotas' impact (Bhavnani 2009; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Chauchard 2014). One 
group of scholars studied the West Bengal gram panchayat across three elections - 1998, 
2003 and 2008 – not only to examine the impact of gender quotas on electoral outcomes 
for women but to address any impact on broader voter attitudes towards women as 
political leaders (Beaman et al, 2012; 2009). Following the implementation of a 
leadership quota in 1998 and 2003 (a woman holding the position of pradhan in a 
council), women were found to be more likely to stand for, and win, positions on that 
council in a subsequent election in 2008. Both women and men were more likely to rate 
women as more effective political leaders if they have been exposed to a woman as 
pradhan of their local council. Crucially, however, the authors found that rather than 
resulting in men being more explicitly supportive of women as political leaders, the 
positive effect is latent, revealed only by psychometric experiments run in the field.7  
A similar experimental assignment of women-only constituency seats at the local level 
also occurred in 2005 in Lesotho, a nation in southern Africa where, as part of 
governmental restructuring, it was mandated that 30 per cent of all of new electoral 
districts (EDs) be reserved solely for women candidates, and these reserved EDs were 
assigned completely at random. Exploring whether or not living in the geographical area 
of an ED that was reserved for women had an effect on the political engagement levels of 
women in the three years following their implementation, Amanda Clayton (2014b: p.25) 
reports that ‘female citizens report strong negative reactions against female beneficiaries 
of Lesotho’s affirmative action policy’. She found ‘no evidence that women view their 
community councils as more open, accessible, and legitimate when they have a female 
representative and that the quota policy increases female constituents’ political 
engagement’ (Clayton, 2014b; p.25). As such, the existing evidence is inconclusive 
regarding the effects of gender quotas on attitudes towards women as political leaders. 
 
Key Arguments and Hypotheses 
The idea that exposure to women politicians will increase support for them reflects 
broader evidence from psychological studies that exposure to ‘out-groups’ increases 
empathy towards that group (Boisjoly et al, 2006). This question of how the physical 
presence of women, often referred to as their ‘descriptive representation’, in political 
institutions, regardless of the presence of quotas, affects societal beliefs regarding the 
ability of women to undertake political activity is under-researched. As Amy Alexander 
(2012, p.438) notes 'empirical investigations of the symbolic effects of women’s 
descriptive representation do not thoroughly investigate this potential effect'. She (2012, 
p.438) presents a longtiduinal analysis of 25 countries to explore the effects of descriptive 
increases and finds that an increase in the percentage of women in parliament contributes 
to an increase in women’s beliefs in women’s ability to govern. She concludes that the 
most accurate portrayal of this relationship is a virtuous cycle of mutually reinforcing 
changes in women’s empowerment as political leaders (Alexander, 2012).  
Alexander does not account for whether such changes in descriptive representation were 
organic or as a result of quotas. Given the notoriety of gender quotas around the world, 
we might expect that a quota itself will have an effect. The commitment of individual 
political parties, or an entire political system, to the principle of equality inherent in 
gender quotas could be seen to have a symbolic effect above and beyond any policy 
changes they bring about in the composition or outputs of the system itself. As Anne 
Phillips (2012, p.517) writes, making such efforts to increase descriptive representation 
of underrepresented groups might tell us ‘more about what it means to be recognized as a 
full member of one’s society than how one can effect policy change’, similar to Jane 
Mansbridge who has noted that inclusion in political life for previously excluded groups 
can bolster a sense of those groups’ ‘ability to rule’ (1999). Related, Nancy Fraser has 
discussed how claims for equality increasingly rest on claims for recognition as much as 
redistribution, where ‘the goal…is a difference-friendly world’ and the cost of social 
participation is not the eliding of differential characteristics on the terms of the existing 
dominant social groups (i.e. men, majority ethnic groups, the wealthy, and so on) (1998, 
pp.1-2). We can also consider the adoption of quotas as part of a broader process of 
normalizing the role of women in political life. Specifically, and in line with 
Normalization Process Theory (NPT), we can think of quota adoption as ‘embedding’ the 
role of women in the political culture of a given polity – whereby ‘material practices 
become routinely embedded in social contexts as the result of people working, 
individually and collectively, to implement them (May and Finch 2009, p.540). Crucially, 
NPT distinguishes between organic and deliberate agentically-derived processes of 
normalization in a way that resembles discussions among feminist political scientists 
differentiating ‘incremental’ from ‘fast-track’ approaches to gender equality (Dahlerup 
and Friedenvall 2005). Along these lines, we theorise a potential ‘vote of confidence’ 
effect – individuals may perceive the implementation of a gender quota as a vote of 
confidence in the ability of women as a whole to perform well as political leaders.8 Based 
on these arguments from symbolic representation, we generate our first hypothesis: 
H₁ – Individuals living in countries where gender quotas are present are 
significantly more likely to hold positive attitudes towards women's ability to act 
as political leaders 
 
It also seems reasonable to suggest that the impact of gender quotas on attitudes to 
women in politics may differ by sex: if a quota acts as an elite cue, it may hold different 
meanings for men and women, possibly dependent on the distinction previously made 
between attitudes towards the mechanism of the quota itself and the outcomes it results 
in. This functions simultaneously alongside any exposure effect discussed above.9 Men 
may take particular issue with quotas, seeing them as limiting the potential political 
opportunities of men in order to provide women with an ‘easier’ route to candidacy 
(Morgan and Buice 2013). Again, with reference to Dahlerup and Friedenvall’s 
classification of equality-promoting measures, this is especially true given the rapid ‘fast-
track’ nature of quotas when compared to an organic ‘incrementalist’ approach (2005). 
Such rapid and enforced changes may result in men seeing quotas as zero-sum, pitting 
them versus women in a way that traditional systems of candidate selection do not. 
Relatedly, men will not have any support they may have for quotas grounded in their own 
lived experience in the way that women might. Based on this, we state Hypothesis 2: 
 
H2 – The 'vote of confidence' effect will differ in magnitude dependent on sex, 
being greater for women than men 
 
It is also likely that any effects might be particular to different types of quota, whereby 
people take issue with the specific way in which the quota itself is implemented. For 
example, many argue that by disrupting the current selection process, a quota acts as an 
illiberal limitation of the range of candidates presented to voters (Murray, 2014). 
Although an individual may broadly support the idea of women as political leaders, they 
may object to the use of a quota to get them there (Clayton, 2014b). Of interest is whether 
the force of implementation of the quota alters any broader impact it has on attitudes 
towards women as political leaders. Scholars suggest that quotas can be classified in four 
main ways: according to the source of their mandate (legal, constitutional, partisan); the 
strength of coercion behind their implementation; the stage at which they impact the 
electoral process, usually in terms of whether the focus is on inputs or outcomes (i.e. a 
quota focused on a minimum percentage of women across all electoral candidates or 
reserved seats within a legislature, respectively); and the ways in which they ‘attempt to 
reform the dynamics of candidate selection’ (Krook, 2013). We suggest that the stronger 
the mandate of the quota, the greater the potential for backlash against it will be, and 
generate hypothesis three: 
 
H3 - Those countries with a legally-mandated quota will witness a smaller 
positive symbolic effect on attitudes towards women as political leaders than 
countries where individual parties have voluntarily adopted quotas 
 
 
Data 
To examine the importance of quotas, whilst controlling for other contextual and 
individual factors, on attitudes to women in politics, we use data from the 2005-2009 
World Values Survey (WVS) from forty-eight countries.12 The analysis is restricted to 
countries that meet the criteria of being a ‘democracy’ as stipulated by the Freedom 
House Index.13 Reflecting the hierarchical nature of the dataset, individuals nested in 
countries, we use a multilevel modelling approach. To assess attitudes towards women in 
politics we use the survey item which asked respondents whether men make better 
political leaders.14 Figure 1 provides a descriptive breakdown by country of the overall 
percentage of respondents who strongly disagreed or disagreed that men made better 
political leaders than women.15 It indicates substantial variation by country, providing 
prima facie justification for our empirical approach.  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
Our main interest is in the contextual variable indicating the presence and mandate-type 
of gender quota. Our first set of analyses focuses on the presence of a quota or not. Here 
the quota variable is coded 0 for no quota, 1 for the existence of a quota. In order to 
examine the source of the mandate, subsequent analyses differentiate between a voluntary 
party quota, and a legally mandated quota, either through electoral or constitutional law.16 
This allows for an assessment of the effect of different quota types on attitudes towards 
women as political leaders and to test H3. 
 
We include five other contextual variables. To directly assess the elite cue argument, we 
include a measure which takes account of the number of women in high prestige 
executive posts. 17 To address the impact of any possible historical legacy of female 
leadership, we also include a variable to capture whether a country previously had a 
woman political leader - Prime Minister or President.18 The share of seats held by women 
in the legislature reflects both the political opportunities available for women in the 
country as well as elite behaviour through the selection of women candidates to stand for 
election.19 Moreover, it is also possible to capture elements of status discontent theory 
given that one could hypothesise a negative association between the number women in 
the legislature and support for women as political leaders, especially among male 
respondents. We also include the percentage of women in the labour force as a proxy 
measure of women’s economic empowerment.20 Finally, scholarly research suggests that 
the more economically developed a country, the greater the likelihood that the 
environment is supportive of feminist values and therefore more likely to be egalitarian 
with greater opportunities for women (Ingelhart and Norris, 2003). To test for this effect, 
we include the GDP per capita index (adjusted for purchase power parity).21  
 
We also include individual level variables that may influence attitudes towards women as 
political leaders. These take account of an individuals’ socio-economic status and wider 
socialization experiences: age, education, ethnicity, employment/occupational status, 
household status and church attendance. Reflecting the theoretical arguments outlined 
earlier in the paper, we include a a left-right measure, an importance of democracy 
variable, a confidence in the political system variable measuring general trust in 
government and political institutions, and a political interest variable.  
 
Model Specification  
The hierarchical nature of the sample suggests that simultaneous modelling of individual 
and country variation through multilevel modelling is the most appropriate specification. 
Our model has individuals at level-1 nested within countries at level-2. The model has 
two parts: a fixed part which contains estimates of the average relationship between the 
dependent variable and the predictor variables across countries and individuals; and a 
random part which estimates the size of the between-country variation relative to the 
within-country, between-individual variation (Goldstein, 2003).  
 
Our key aim is to measure the effect of gender quotas on attitudes to women as political 
leaders. The dependent variable is measured on a four point ordinal scale from strongly 
agree to strongly disagree. We specify a generalized multilevel ordinal model with 
cumulative probabilities linked with responses as dependent. For the ith individual from 
the jth country the probability of a response denoting support for women as political 
leaders higher than that represented by s is specified as γij(s) – where 0 < γij(1) < γij(2) < γij(3) 
< γij(4) = 1 (Fielding and Yang, 2005). Here the probabilities for s are cumulated upwards 
while those of the ordered responses for support of women leaders are cumulated 
downwards. A link transformation (inverse distribution function of a continuous variable) 
of a set of cumulative probabilities on the 0, 1 scale is then used. On this link scale, a set 
of cut-points for each individual is obtained from the individual’s probability distribution 
over the support for women leaders and vice versa (Fielding, Yang and Goldstein, 2003). 
Here the link transformation γij(s) (s = 1, 2, 3, 4) relates to sequential points on the real 
line (αij(1), αij(2), αij(3), + ∞) with αij(s) representing the thresholds of attitudes to women 
leaders. It is possible to illustrate the generalized multilevel ordinal proportional odds 
model with fixed predictor variables/covariates in equation 1 (Fielding, Yang and 
Goldstein, 2003; Yang, 2001). 
 
Logit (γij(s)) = α(s)+Xij β+ Zij u0j    s = 1,2…t-1 (1) 
 
 
For the jth country, there is a single random effect u0j, which is assumed to be N(0, ) 
distributed. In the equation, the Z variables are a subset of X variables and β is a vector of 
fixed effects coefficients which relate to the covariates included in Xij. In accordance 
with the proportional odds procedure, for all s the random and fixed effects function on 
cumulative odds by constant multiplicative factors. All the multilevel models presented 
here are fitted using MLwiN 2.26, with the estimates for the model derived using a 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo method with diffuse priors (MCMC) estimation procedure.22 
In keeping with the descriptive evidence above, we expect to find variation in attitudes 
towards women as political leaders at the country level. The null models indicate the 
level of clustering (Intra-Class Correlation Coefficient (ICC)) for the dependent variable 
across the whole sample.23 These are presented in Table 1. There is significant country 
level clustering (between-country variance) in support for women leaders, justifying our 
modelling strategy. 
 
Insert Table 1  
 
Table 2 presents the findings of three multilevel ordered logistic models of support for 
women as political leaders using MCMC estimation for the whole sample (n=60,197). In 
column 1, the model includes the gender quota variable (binary measure) and the 
individual-level explanatory variables. Column 2 also contains the five additional 
contextual variables along with individual-level explanations. Including these assesses 
whether the existence of a quota has a significant effect on support for women as political 
leaders after controlling for individual and contextual factors (H1). The model in column 
3 additionally specifies a cross-level interaction between sex (female) and gender quotas 
to determine whether women in countries where gender quotas were present were more 
likely to support women leaders (H2). Table 3 follows the same format. Column one in 
Table 3 includes the same individual variables and a gender quota contextual variable. 
However, the latter is differentiated by the source of the mandate – whether the quota was 
implemented on a voluntary basis or legally mandated. Column 2 also includes the other 
five contextual variables allowing us to directly test H3. Column 3 includes cross level 
interactions between sex (female) and these different quota variables. All specifications 
use the same individual-level and contextual variables. At the bottom of each column, we 
report the between-country variance, the ICC and two model fit statistics to assess 
goodness of fit. In sequential models the proportion of total variance (ICC) in support for 
women leaders at the country level is reduced, as is the Deviance Information Criterion 
(DIC), suggesting a significant improvement in model fit compared to the null model.24 
 
Individual and Contextual Influences on Support for Women as Political Leaders 
 
In Table 2 and Table 3 we report the multilevel ordered logistic models of support for 
women as political leaders for the whole sample of respondents using the specifications 
outlined above. Women are significantly more likely to express support for women as 
political leaders than men. For women, the odds of being strongly supportive versus the 
other combined categories are around two times greater than men, where all the other 
variables in the model are held constant. Those with higher levels of education and 
holding a professional occupation are more supportive of women as political leaders. We 
also observe empirical support for female empowerment effects at the country level: 
countries with greater numbers of women in the workplace and in paid employment are 
significantly more likely to be home to individuals who are more positive in their 
attitudes toward women in politics. On the other hand, both young people and the older 
age cohort were less likely to indicate their support and, as expected given previous 
scholarly evidence, those who are self-employed, retired, unemployed, and religious 
respondents are also less supportive. Those in the sample who work from home, 98 per 
cent of whom are women, also demonstrate lower levels of support for women leaders. 
 
There is a clear association between individual beliefs in the importance of democracy 
and positive attitudes towards women in politics. Support for democracy may reflect 
wider support for egalitarianism and therefore equal levels of political representation. 
Those who are strongly dissatisfied with the political system are notably more likely to 
favour greater gender equality and be strongly supportive of women leaders. This finding 
is consistent with existing research in this area (Morgan and Buice, 2013). 
 
Turning to the four models where contextual variables are included,25 existing research 
suggests that exposure to women in legislative office has the capacity to garner mass 
positive attitudes to women as political leaders. This is confirmed here. We find clear 
evidence that support for gender equality among those individuals living in countries is 
higher where there are greater numbers of women in the legislature. However, there is no 
evidence that women serving in high prestige executive posts promote greater support for 
women as political leaders.26 One might expect that those politicians in high prestige 
executive positions generally have broader public platforms, are more visible, and may 
illustrate de facto competence and expertise to a wider public, therefore generating high 
levels of exposure. However, we found no evidence that the exposure effect of women 
appointed to high prestige executive positions has a strong positive effect on shaping 
attitudes to women as political leaders. Similarly, support for women leaders was not 
significantly greater in countries that had experienced a woman holding the top executive 
post (Prime Minister or President) than those countries that had not. Across all the 
models, GDP and the level of women in paid employment are the only other contextual 
variables that are significant in the hypothesized direction when controlling for all other 
factors. GDP, broadly measuring societal conditions and economic development, has a 
strong effect across all the models. Put simply, having controlled for other individual-
level and contextual variables, those living in more prosperous countries far more or 
supportive of women as political leaders than those in less economically developed 
countries.  
 
Insert Table 2 and Table 3 
 
Do gender quotas increase support for women as political leaders? 
We find evidence that gender quotas increase support for women as political leaders, 
even once their effects and other predictors of their presence are controlled for. In Table 
2, across all models, we find a significant positive effect with those living in countries 
with a quota being between 2.77 (without contextual controls, column 1) and 1.99 times 
(with controls, column 2) more likely to support women as political leaders than those 
where no quota is present. We calculate predicted probabilities for Model 2b where all 
other variables are set at their mean values. Respondents in countries with quotas, all 
other things being equal, are around 7% more likely to be strongly supportive of women 
leaders than those living in a country with no quota. It is clear that for individuals living 
in countries with gender quotas, the presence of a quota alone improves assessments of 
the viability of women as political leaders. We argue that this is demonstrative of gender 
quotas acting having a ‘vote of confidence’ effect for women in politics, providing 
support for H₁.  
 
But to our surprise there is little evidence that the quota type makes a difference. We 
hypothesized that legally mandated quotas would reduce the positive effect of quotas on 
attitude towards women as political leaders relative to those that had been voluntarily 
implemented. Table 3 shows the three models where the quota variable is categorised by 
mandate. After including controls, our findings suggest that there is no significant 
difference between the effects of these types of quota, and we reject H3. What seems to 
matter is the fact of the presence of the quota itself, not whether it was legally, 
constitutionally or voluntarily applied. 
 
Our expectation was that men would be less likely to have their attitudes towards women 
as political leaders positively affected by a quota's presence than women (H2). As noted, 
women were significantly more likely to be supportive of women as political leaders than 
men.  To test whether women are more likely than men to regard the implementation of 
quotas as a symbolic ‘vote of confidence’, we include a cross level interaction between 
sex (female) and gender quota. This is shown in Table 2 (column 3) and is repeated in 
Table 3 (column 3) where sex is interacted with the types of quota (legally mandated). 
Our findings provide some evidence that the impact of gender quotas differ by sex. For 
women, the presence of a gender quota alone has a positive effect on attitudes towards 
women as political leaders. We argue that this is demonstrative of gender quotas 
providing a ‘vote of confidence’ effect in women overall and more specifically in the 
competence and ability of women to perform well in public office and as political 
leaders. But when we examine this relationship by the source of mandate, we find that 
their impact does not vary by sex. For women, it is the presence of a gender quota that 
enhances support for women in politics; it does not appear to matter whether the quota 
itself is voluntary or legally mandated.  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have presented the first ever cross-country assessment of the impact of 
gender quotas on attitudes towards women as political leaders. Using data from forty-
eight countries worldwide, we have provided initial evidence that support for women in 
politics is increased by the presence of a gender quota. Additionally, we provide evidence 
that the impact of gender quotas differs by sex. Our findings suggest that amongst women 
the presence of a quota is associated with increased levels of support for women as 
political leaders. It is the presence of a quota that is important for women, not the type of 
quota. Finally, we demonstrate that the type of quota, measured by the source of its 
mandate, does not impact on the overall positive effect that quotas have on attitudes 
towards women as political leaders, but one that in hindsight is supported by the fact that 
quota introduction is elite-driven. 
 
However, we are keen to highlight the preliminary nature of our conclusions, which are 
such owing to the limitations of available comparative data. We have utilized cross-
sectional data to explore our research questions. An ideal solution that would allow for 
optimum exploration of similar research questions to our own would take the form of a 
longitudinal panel. Unfortunately, no such cross-national panel data currently exists. One 
of the possible advantages of panel data would be to address any possible endogeneity 
concerns relating to quota adoption as being elite driven rather than emanating from 
wider public concerns. However, even this would not resolve the issue of direction of 
cause unless public sentiment towards quota adoption and the role of social and political 
movements were not addressed over a sustained period prior to the implementation of the 
quota (see Clayton, 2014b, p.11 for a discussion of these methodological issues). 
Experimental data using before and after designs would suffer from the same issues.  
 
We briefly wish to address why the pattern we hypothesise is more plausible than its 
opposite – the possibility that quotas come about in countries that are broadly more 
sympathetic to women as political leaders or women in politics in a wider sense. First, 
existing research on how the 'strongest', legally-mandated quotas are adopted in the cases 
included in our sample, detailed below, suggests that legally-mandated quotas generally 
came about as a result of elite support for them, not as a result of mass popular appeal 
that subsequently forced elites to react. In France, Spain, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, 
scholars have found that the quota policy was elite-driven and not provoked by 
overwhelming public feeling (Baldez 2004; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008; Krook 2010; 
Miguel 2012; Verge 2012). Similarly, research on Rwanda which saw a gender quota 
implemented post-civil war, emphasizes the role of political elites and feminist interest 
groups in achieving quota implementation (Bauer and Burnet, 2013, p.107). Evidence 
from Morocco and Serbia highlights the role of international influence in the adoption of 
a quota (Mresevic 2004; Sater 2012). 
 
Second, generally speaking, voluntary quotas are adopted by left-wing parties following 
internal debates. Again, these are not policies formed in reaction to overwhelming public 
support for them. For instance, 16 of the 18 countries in our sample who have voluntary 
quota polices were indeed adopted by ‘left-wing’ parties. Only in Sweden and Finland do 
parties that occupy the centre ground adopt such policies.10 Consequently, we are 
confident that the adoption of legally-mandated quotas across the cases we include in our 
analysis was not simply a result of mass public demand. This is not to say that this is 
never the case, as evidence suggests that it is in some cases (Krook, 2009). Simply, 
evidence from the countries in our sample that have adopted legally-mandated quotas 
suggests that adoption in these cases was not the result of pre-existing public demand.  
 
More generally, it is plausible that even in cases where quotas are elite driven this does 
not preclude elites holding attitudes which are both correlated with public concerns as 
well as the likelihood of quota adoption. This is a possible objection to our claims that 
quotas act as an elite cue. However, it is important to reiterate that we do not make any 
causal claims or suggest that quota adoption is completely orthogonal to public 
sentiment. Given the lack of any country-level data over time to address this issue, all 
that can be done is to document existing case study evidence from countries included in 
our sample and statistically examine national and sub-group averages of attitudes before 
and after quota adoption. In both cases there is robust qualitative evidence that, among 
the countries included in our analysis, quotas generally come about as a result of elite 
support for them, not as a result of mass popular appeal. Additional puzzles also persist – 
what are the mechanisms by which norms around the idea that women should be involved 
with politics at the same level and rate as men diffuse? This remains unclear.  
 
In many ways, our findings are intuitive. Popular support for the ability of women to 
perform well in positions of political leadership is buoyed by the elite ‘vote of 
confidence’ that quotas provide. These findings present new evidence of the effect of 
quotas, suggesting that they may help to normalise the presence and involvement of 
women in politics regardless of their eventual policy or compositional effects. 
Additionally, the public discourse surrounding a quota's implementation may have a 
consciousness-raising effect, provoking public discussion on the issue. For supporters of 
quotas, our findings suggest that they are beneficial, resulting in the general public 
feeling more positive about women's ability to hold positions of political power, with this 
being especially true of women. Advocates could interpret this as a double-positive and a 
signal that perseverance with quotas is critical. Regardless of any negativity that may 
surround them, quotas have a positive effect on levels of support for women in politics. 
 
In this paper we have broken new ground in charting the impact of quotas on cross-
national levels of public support for women as political leaders, but we are keen to note 
the limitations of our work and highlight future directions of study. Research that focuses 
specifically on attitudes towards gender quotas may provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the evidence we present here. For example, the ‘vote of confidence’ 
effect we have put forward in this paper could be operationalised experimentally. 
Building on recent work by Murray (2014), shifting the focus of quotas from increasing 
the numbers of women in politics to instead limiting the numbers of men may uncover 
the deeper roots of these attitudes, allowing for an effective untangling of quotas 
themselves and the narratives that often surround them.  
 
Notes 
1 Others suggests that this effect is contingent on the type of quota adopted (Schwindt-
Bayer, 2009). Clayton (2014b) finds that women additionally won seats outside of those 
reserved by a quota mechanism, suggesting a contagion effect. Like Krook 2013, we 
acknowledge that gender quotas are perhaps more accurately referred to as ‘sex quotas’ 
given the nature of the distinction they typify. However, we follow the existing literature 
and term them ‘gender quotas’.  
 
2 However, these effects are contested. For examples, see Broockman 2014; Dolan 2006. 
 
3 For clarity, we refer to ‘attitudes towards women in politics’ and ‘gender attitudes’ as 
distinct things; the former focused on politics, the latter constituting broader attitudes 
regarding gender roles in society and feminist tendencies. 
 
4 The broader idea that women may ‘do politics’ differently to men is also explored in 
Dahlerup 1998. 
 
5 On candidate selection and electoral performance, see Bhavnani 2009; Cutts et al, 2008.  
 
6 Morgan and Buice’s 2013 study of Latin American attitudes to women in politics find 
no impact of gender quota laws as a main effect or when interacted with women’s share 
of legislative seats. However, the quota variable is not discussed in any depth or included 
as a contextual variable in the models presented in the main paper, precluding 
understanding of any non-significant effect it might have had. 
 
7 Beaman et al (2009) adopt Implicit Association Tests (IATs) to test this relationship. 
The authors found that men in villages with female pradhans were more likely to pair 
female names and leadership roles.  
 
8 This could also be described as an effect of symbolic representation of sorts in the mode 
of Pitkin 1967, although it is more akin to the abstract idea of citizenship and efficacy put 
forward by Phillips in the quote above. There is existing evidence of role model effects 
(Alexander 2012; Beaman et al 2012), although these differ from the mechanism we are 
hypothesising here because they relate to individuals in office as opposed to the presence 
of a quota alone. 
 
9 An alternative argument would be that if women politicians are simply better at 
representing women’s interests, as suggested by a range of literature (Chatopadhyay and 
Duflo 2004; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993), women might simply be more satisfied where 
there are more women and thus express greater support for them as political leaders based 
on their effectiveness. Unfortunately, we cannot measure this specific mechanism with 
the available data, but this could be explored in future research. 
 
10 See the appendix for the full list of political parties from countries included in our 
sample that have adopted voluntary quotas. 
 
12 The data is drawn from Wave 5 of the World Values Survey 2005-2009. All data can 
be downloaded from http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV5.jsp. 
Sampling information is available for all countries included in our analysis at this 
address.  
 
13 We used Freedom House data from the year in which the survey was carried out. Hong 
Kong and Taiwan are excluded from our analysis owing to difficulties encountered in 
obtaining reliable aggregate data. The following countries were considered to be 
undemocratic according to Freedom House and therefore were omitted from the analysis: 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Thailand, China, Rwanda, Russia and Vietnam.  
 
14 The survey question asked, “On the whole, men make better political leaders than 
women do”; do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree.  
 
15 Across the 48 countries, 60% strongly disagreed or disagreed than men made better 
political leaders.  
 
16 This quota variable is coded as follows: 0 = No quota; 1 = Voluntary Quota; 2 = 
Legally mandated quota. For data on quota adoption, see 
http://eaces.liuc.it/18242979201001/182429792010070102.pdf, www.quotaproject.org, 
and Krook (2006). The year of first adoption of any type of quota is recorded, and this 
variable is only coded positively if the quota was in place prior to the year in which the 
survey was undertaken. Further details on the party family and electoral success of parties 
adopting voluntary quotas at the most recent election prior to WVS data collection taking 
place are included in the Appendix. 
 
17 The variable high prestige executive posts is derived from the four main offices of the 
state – Prime Minister, Chancellor, Foreign Secretary/Minster and Home Secretary or 
Internal Minister (Krook and O’Brien 2012). We operationalize this as a count where 0 = 
No Women in these prestige executive posts and 4 = All women in these prestige 
executive posts. This was calculated using CIA data on Chiefs of State and Cabinet 
Members of Foreign Governments (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-
leaders-1/AN.html).  
 
18 All the information is collated from http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0801534.html and 
http://www.guide2womenleaders.com/ and focuses solely those women in executive 
offices and not royalty. The variable is a measure of the number of years of female 
executive leadership in a country since 1950. 
 
19 The percentage of women in the lower house/primary legislature was taken from 
www.ipu.org. This figure is for the month(s) in which the fieldwork took place. 
 
20 The labour force participation rate is the proportion of the population aged 15+ that is 
economically active for the year in which the survey was carried out. For Andorra, this 
was unavailable, and a proxy measure was used: % of female employment in the non-
agricultural sector obtained from the World Bank.  
 
21 GDP per capita is from the World Bank for the year prior to that in which the first 
fieldwork for the survey was undertaken in each specific country. It is available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=1 
 
22 The starting values are obtained using second-order PQL, then 5,000 runs to derive the 
desired proposal distribution, followed by 50,000 simulated random draws to obtain the 
final estimates. We use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm and the default diffuse gamma 
priors for variance parameters. 
 
23 The Intra-Class Correlation Coefficient (ICC) is calculated as follows. For the 
underlying latent variable, the level one residual is Π2/3 while the total residual variance 
is Π2/3+ . The proportion of total variance attributed to variation between countries is 
/( +Π2/3). 
 
24 The DIC statistic accounts for the number of parameters in the model. If the difference 
between models is 2 or less, then this suggests no difference while a difference of 10 or 
more indicates an improvement in model fit. 
 
25 We found little evidence of multicollinearity. The correlations are as follows: Quota 
and Percentage Women in legislature = 0.27; Quota and Prestige executive posts = 0.31; 
Quota and Previous woman leader = -0.17; Prestige executive posts and Previous woman 
leader = -0.05. All the VIF and Tolerance statistics were within the established criteria. 
 
26 We find little evidence of any severe multicollinearity between the two variables: the 
correlation is 0.44 and VIF and Tolerance statistics were well within the established 
criteria. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of respondents who strongly disagreed or disagreed that Men made 
better political leaders than Women 
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Table 1: Multilevel Ordinal Variance Components Model of Overall Support for 
Women as Political Leaders (MCMC: 5,000 burn in; 50,000 runs) 
 
 
 
Variables Model 1 
Overall 
β       SE 
Cut-Point 3 2.29*  0.16 
Cut-Point 2 0.54*  0.16 
Cut-Point 1 -1.68*  0.16 
Random Part  
Between Country Variance 0.94*  0.21 
ICC 0.22 
Deviance (MCMC) 142228 
DIC 142278 
N 60197 
 
 
*Significant = < 0.05 level 
Table 2: Multilevel Ordinal Logistic Models of Overall Support for Women as Political 
Leaders (MCMC: 5,000 burn in; 50,000 runs): Presence of Quota 
 
Variables Model 2a 
β SE 
Model 2b 
β SE 
Model 2c 
β SE 
Political Variables    
Confidence in Political System -0.20*  0.02 -0.20*  0.02 -0.20*  0.02 
Importance of Democracy 0.06*  0.00 0.06*  0.00 0.06*  0.00 
Left-Right Scale -0.05*  0.00 -0.05*  0.00 -0.05*  0.00 
Political Interest 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Employment: Base: FT/PT Work    
Work in the Home -0.21*  0.03 -0.21*  0.03 -0.21*  0.03 
Self Employed -0.08*  0.03 -0.08*  0.03 -0.08*  0.03 
Student 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 
Retired -0.09*  0.03 -0.09*  0.03 -0.09*  0.03 
Unemployed -0.07*  0.03 -0.07*  0.03 -0.07*  0.03 
Other Employment 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 
Missing Employment 0.27*  0.08 0.27*  0.08 0.27*  0.09 
Education: No Qualifications    
Degree 0.73*  0.04 0.72*  0.05 0.73*  0.05 
Below Degree (University) 0.61*  0.05 0.60*  0.05 0.60*  0.05 
Post-Secondary Education 0.46*  0.04 0.46*  0.04 0.46*  0.04 
Secondary Education 0.41*  0.04 0.41*  0.04 0.41*  0.04 
Primary Education 0.15*  0.04 0.15*  0.04 0.15*  0.04 
Missing Education 0.36*  0.11 0.35*  0.10 0.35*  0.11 
Age: Middle Age 30-44    
Young Age <25 -0.07*  0.02 -0.07*  0.02 -0.07*  0.02 
Mid/Older Age 45-59 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
Old Age 60 plus -0.21*  0.03 -0.21*  0.03 -0.21*  0.03 
Other Controls    
Female 0.74*  0.02 0.74*  0.02 0.70*  0.03 
Professional 0.08*  0.03 0.08*  0.03 0.08*  0.03 
Church Attendance -0.11*  0.02 -0.10*  0.02 -0.10*  0.02 
Married -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
Country Level Variables    
Quota 1.02*  0.31 0.69*   0.15 0.64*   0.15 
Prior Woman Leader - 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
Women in High Prestige Cabinet 
Posts 
- 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.13 
Women in Legislature - 0.03*   0.01 0.03*   0.01 
GDP Per Capita - 0.29*   0.08 0.28*   0.09 
Female Employment - 0.03*   0.01 0.03*   0.01 
Cross-Level Interactions    
Female*Quota - - 0.07*  0.03 
Cut-Point 3 1.01*  0.27 -0.70*  0.25 -0.54*  0.26 
Cut-Point 2 -0.80*  0.27 -2.51*  0.25 -2.35*  0.26 
Cut-Point 1 -3.12*  0.27 -4.83*  0.25 -4.67*  0.26 
Random Part    
Between Country Variance 0.73*  0.17 0.32*   0.07 0.31*  0.07 
ICC 0.18 0.09 0.09 
Deviance (MCMC) 138611 138611 138607 
DIC 138685 138684 138682 
N 60197 60197 60197 
 
*Significant =<0.05 
Table 3: Multilevel Ordinal Logistic Models of Overall Support for Women as Political 
Leaders (MCMC: 5,000 burn in; 50,000 runs): Quota – Source of Mandate 
 
Variables Model 3a 
β SE 
Model 3b 
β SE 
Model 3c 
β SE 
Political Variables    
Confidence in Political System -0.20*  0.02 -0.20*  0.02 -0.20*  0.02 
Importance of Democracy 0.06*  0.00 0.06*  0.00 0.06*  0.00 
Left-Right Scale -0.05*  0.00 -0.05*  0.00 -0.05*  0.00 
Political Interest 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Employment: Base: FT/PT Work    
Work in the Home -0.21*  0.03 -0.21*  0.03 -0.21*  0.03 
Self Employed -0.08*  0.03 -0.08*  0.03 -0.08*  0.03 
Student 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Retired -0.09*  0.03 -0.09*  0.03 -0.09*  0.03 
Unemployed -0.07*  0.03 -0.07*  0.03 -0.07*  0.03 
Other Employment 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 
Missing Employment 0.27*  0.09 0.26*  0.08 0.26*  0.08 
Education: No Qualifications    
Degree 0.73*  0.04 0.73*  0.05 0.72*  0.05 
Below Degree (University) 0.61*  0.05 0.60*  0.05 0.59*  0.05 
Post-Secondary Education 0.47*  0.04 0.46*  0.04 0.45*  0.04 
Secondary Education 0.41*  0.04 0.41*  0.04 0.40*  0.04 
Primary Education 0.15*  0.04 0.15*  0.04 0.14*  0.04 
Missing Education 0.36*  0.10 0.35*  0.11 0.35*  0.10 
Age: Middle Age 30-44    
Young Age <25 -0.07*  0.02 -0.07*  0.02 -0.07*  0.02 
Mid/Older Age 45-59 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
Old Age 60 plus -0.21*  0.03 -0.21*  0.03 -0.21*  0.03 
Other Controls    
Female 0.74*  0.02 0.74*  0.02 0.75*  0.03 
Professional 0.08*  0.03 0.08*  0.03 0.08*  0.03 
Church Attendance -0.11*  0.02 -0.10*  0.02 -0.11*  0.02 
Married -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
Country Level Variables    
Quota: Voluntary    
No Quota -0.84*  0.26 -0.50*   0.19 -0.41*   0.20 
Legally Mandated Quota 0.07 0.30 0.37 0.20 0.47 0.29 
Prior Woman Leader - 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Women in High Prestige Cabinet 
Posts 
- -0.00 0.12 -0.01 0.13 
Women in Legislature - 0.03*   0.01 0.03*   0.01 
GDP Per Capita - 0.34*   0.09 0.35*   0.09 
Female Employment - 0.02*   0.00 0.02*   0.01 
Cross-Level Interactions    
Female*No Quota - - 0.05 0.04 
Female*Legally Mandated Quota - - -0.05 0.04 
Cut-Point 3 1.94*  0.20 0.37 0.21 0.26 0.24 
Cut-Point 2 0.13 0.20 -1.44*   0.21 -1.55*  0.24 
Cut-Point 1 -2.20*  0.20 -3.77*   0.21 -3.89*  0.24 
Random Part    
Between Country Variance 0.72*  0.16 0.29*   0.07 0.29*  0.07 
ICC 0.18 0.08 0.08 
Deviance (MCMC) 138611 138611 138607 
DIC 138685 138685 138682 
N 60197 60197 60197 
*Significant =<0.05 
Appendix 
 
Country 
Year 
of 
Surve
y 
Year 
of 
First 
Quota 
Names of Parties with Voluntary Quota at 
Previous Election (Party Family) 
Year of 
Previous 
Election 
Combined 
Vote Share 
at Prior 
Lower 
House 
Election 
Australia 2005 1994 Labor Party (SOC) 2004 47.3 
Canada 2006 1992 
New Democratic Party (SOC), Liberal Party 
(LIB) 2006 47.7 
Chile 2006 1996 
Party for Democracy (COM), Socialist Party 
of Chile (SOC) Christian Democratic Party 
(CHR). 2005 46.2 
Cyprus 2008 1995 
Movement of Social Democrats (SOC), 
Democratic Rally of Cyprus (NAT) 2006 39.2 
Germany 2006 1986 
Social Democratic Party (SOC), The Left 
Party (COM), Alliance90/Greens (SOC), 
Christian Democratic Union (CHR) 2005 76.4 
Great 
Britain 2005 1993 Labour Party (SOC) 2005 35.2 
Guatemala 2005 2002 
National Unity for Hope Party (UNE), 
Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity (URNG)$ 2003 22.1 
Hungary 2009 1993 Hungarian Socialist Party (SOC) 2006 40.3 
 
Italy 
 
        
2005 1989 
Democrats of the Left (COM), The Sunflower 
(ECO) – including Italian Democractic 
Socialists # and Green Federation, Democracy 
is Freedom – the Daisy (LIB) including Italian 
People’s Party, Communist Refoundation# 2001 33.32 
 
Netherland
s 2006 1987 Labour Party (SOC), Green Left (ECO) 2003 32.4 
Norway 2007 1975 
Socialist Left Party (COM), Norwegian 
Labour Party (SOC), Centre Party (AGR), 
Christian People’s Party (CHR) 2005 54.8 
South 
Africa 2006 2006 African National Congress (SOC) 2004 69.7 
South 
Korea 2005 1995 
Grand National Party (CON), Democratic 
Labour Party (SOC) 2004 48.8 
Sweden 2006 1978 
Social Democratic Party (SOC), Left Party 
(COM), Green Party (ECO), Liberal Party 
(LIB), Christian Democratic Party (CHR) 2002   75.4 
Switzerland 2007 1995 Social Democratic Party (SOC) 2003 23.3 
Thailand 2007 2005 Democrat Party (DP)$ 2006 
N/A 
election 
boycotted, 
received 
30.3% in 
2007 rerun 
Turkey 2007 1999 
The Republican People’s Party (SOC), Peace 
and Democracy Party (SOC) 2002 19.4 
Uruguay 2006 1980 Socialist Party of Uruguay (SOC) 2004 
51.7 (part 
of slate) 
 
 
Information on Political Parties that have adopted Voluntary Quotas - Party Family data and 
codes taken from the MARPOR Comparative Manifesto Project, https://manifesto-
project.wzb.eu/; ECO=Ecological/Green, CHR=Christian/Confessional, COM=Socialist, 
CON=Conservative, LIB=Liberal, NAT=Nationalist, SOC=Social Democratic. # Date of quota 
adoption unclear. $ No party family data available from MARPOR. Further data collected from 
Krook (2009) and www.quotaproject.org.  
 
Variable Coding Details: Individual Level 
 
Variable (Individual Level) Rang 
e 
Coding 
Sex (Female) 0, 1 Whether the respondent is a women (1) or man (0) 
Married 0, 1 Whether the respondent is married (1) or not (0) 
Attends church once a week 
or more 
0, 1 Whether the respondent attends church once a week 
or more (1) or not (0) 
Professional Occupation  Whether the respondent works in a professional 
occupation (accountant, lawyer, teacher etc.) (1) or 
not (0) 
Employment – Base category 
= Full Time/Part Time work 
0, 1 Whether the respondent is in full or part time work 
(1) or not (0) 
Self Employed 0, 1 Whether the respondent is self-employed (1) or not 
(0) 
Retired 0, 1 Whether the respondent is retired (1) or not (0) 
Work in the Home 0, 1 Whether the respondent works in the home (1) or 
not (0) 
Student 0, 1 Whether the respondent is a student (1) or not (0) 
Unemployed 0, 1 Whether the respondent is unemployed (1) or not (0) 
Other Employment 0, 1 Whether the respondent is in other employment (1) 
or not (0) 
Missing Employment 0, 1 Whether the respondent is categorised as missing on 
the employment variable (1) or not (0) 
Education – Base category = 0, 1 Whether the respondent has no qualifications (1) or 
No qualifications  not (0) 
Primary Education 0, 1 Whether the respondent has primary qualifications 
(1) or not (0) 
Secondary Education 0, 1 Whether the respondent has secondary qualifications 
(1) or not (0) 
Post-Secondary Education 0, 1 Whether the respondent has post-secondary 
qualifications (1) or not (0) 
Below Degree 0, 1 Whether the respondent has educational 
qualifications at below degree level (1) or not (0) 
Degree 0, 1 Whether the respondent has a degree qualification 
(1) or not (0) 
Missing Education 0, 1 Whether the respondent is categorised as missing on 
the education variable (1) or not (0) 
Age – Base category = 
Middle age 30-44 
0, 1 Whether the respondent is aged between 30 and 44 
years old (1) or not (0) 
Young age 18-29 0, 1 Whether the respondent is aged 18 to 29 (1) or not 
(0) 
Middle/Older Age 45-59 0, 1 Whether the respondent is aged 45-59 (1) or not (0) 
Old age 60 plus 0, 1 Whether the respondent is aged 60 plus (1) or not 
(0) 
Left-Right 1-10 Respondents’ self-position on a political scale 1 = 
Left; 10 = Right 
Political Interest 0, 1 Whether the respondent is very/somewhat interested 
in politics (1) or not (0) 
Confidence in Political 
System 
0, 1 Whether the respondent has confidence in the 
political system (government/parliament and 
political parties (1) or not (0) 
Importance of Democracy 1-10 Whether the respondent believes democracy is 
important 0 =not at all important; 10= absolutely 
important 
 
 
 
 
Variable Coding Details: Country Level 
 
 
 
Variable (Country Level) Range Coding 
Quota* 0, 1 Country in which the respondent lives where 
gender quotas are present = 1; absence = 0 
Quota Categorical Variable 1-3 Country in which the respondent lives where 
there are No quotas= 1; Voluntary quotas = 2; 
Legally mandated quotas = 3 
Prior Woman Leader 0-15 Total Years a woman has been leader in the 
country in which the respondent lives 
Women in High Prestige 
Cabinet Posts 
0-2 Number of women in high prestige cabinet 
posts in the country where the respondent lives 
– 0 = None; 1 = One; Two = Two or more 
Women in Legislature 0-100 Percentage women in the legislature in the 
  country the respondent lives 
GDP Per Capita (raw data) -.76 to 3.98 GDP per capita – variable is standardized. 
Female Employment 0-100 Percentage Female Labour Force Participation 
in the country the respondent lives 
*There are 30 countries which have adopted gender quotas out of the 56 in the sample. Of 
those 30 countries, 19 are voluntary and 11 are legally mandated. 
